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Abstract—Machine learning models are shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. While most of the existing methods for
adversarial attack and defense work on 2D image domains, a few recent ones attempt to extend the studies to 3D data of point clouds.
However, adversarial results obtained by these methods typically contain point outliers, which are both noticeable and easier to be
defended by simple techniques of outlier removal. Motivated by the different mechanisms when humans perceive 2D images and 3D
shapes, we propose in this paper a new design of geometry-aware objectives, whose solutions favor (discrete versions of) the desired
surface properties of smoothness and fairness. To generate adversarial point clouds, we use a misclassification loss of targeted attack
that supports continuous pursuing of more malicious signals. Regularizing the targeted attack loss with our proposed geometry-aware
objectives gives our proposed method of Geometry-Aware Adversarial Attack (GeoA3). Results of GeoA3 tend to be more adversarial,
arguably less defendable, and of the key adversarial characterization of being imperceptible to humans. While the main focus of this
paper is to learn to generate adversarial point clouds, we also present a simple but effective algorithm termed Iterative Tangent Jittering
(IterTanJit), in order to preserve surface-level adversarial effects when re-sampling point clouds from the surface meshes reconstructed
from adversarial point clouds. We quantitatively evaluate our methods on both synthetic and physical object models in terms of attack
success rate and geometric regularity. For qualitative evaluation, we conduct subjective studies by collecting human preferences from
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Comparative results in comprehensive experiments confirm the advantages of our proposed methods over
existing ones. We make our source codes publicly available.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MODERN machine learning models, particularly thosebased on deep networks, have been achieving re-
markable success on a variety of semantic tasks, with clas-
sification of 2D images [1], [2], [3] and 3D point clouds [4],
[5], [6], [7] as the prominent representatives. In spite of the
success, these models are vulnerable to adversarial examples
[8] — specially crafted perturbations of input data that are
as small as imperceptible to our humans would cause failure
of these classification models. Such a phenomenon prevails
across models and data types [9], [10], [11]. The existence
of adversarial examples triggers a great amount of research
focusing either on attack/defense studies for safety-critical
applications [12], [13], [14], or on the robustness analysis of
machine learning models [15], [16], [17].
The seminal work of Szegedy et al. [8] discovers adver-
sarial 2D images from analyzing the classification robust-
ness of deep networks. Following [8], subsequent research
plays attack-and-defense games and formalizes the attack
problem by proposing various algorithms to search for
adversarial noises [18], [19], [20], where an important char-
acterization of the produced adversarial images is impercep-
tibility. To achieve imperceptibility, these methods typically
constrain the lp-norms of adversarial noise to be small on
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the 2D image domain. Effectiveness of such a scheme is
grounded on how our humans perceive 2D images. Indeed,
when adding noise of small magnitude to a benign im-
age, human perception is overwhelmed by the appearance
patterns contained in the original image, rather than by
the added high-frequency but small-magnitude noise that
has no semantic patterns; adversarial imperceptibility is
achieved consequently.
More recently, this general idea of adversarial attack is
employed to 3D data of point clouds [11], [21], [22], [23].
They learn to either perturb individual points contained
in a point cloud or attach additional points to it, in order
to make the resulting point cloud be misclassified by a
point set classifier of interest [4], [5], [6]. To achieve the
objective of imperceptibility, these methods follow works of
adversarial 2D images, and constrain the adversarial point
cloud such that it is close to the benign one under certain
distance metrics of point set. This seems a straightforward
technical extension at a first glance. Unfortunately, adver-
sarial point clouds obtained by these methods typically con-
tain point outliers, and these point outliers are particularly
noticeable when humans perceive the underlying surface
represented by the point cloud, as shown in Figure 1 —
one can intuitively think of outliers of a point cloud as
those away from the underlying surface. We analyze in this
work the inefficacy of directly applying the methodology
of generating adversarial 2D images to generation of 3D
point clouds, and argue that the inefficacy may be attributed
to the sharp difference between our human perception of
2D images and that of 3D shapes. Psychophysical evidence
shows that humans perceive object surface shapes from
combined sources of motion, texture, shading, boundary
contour, etc [24], where object boundary contours are par-
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2ticularly effective to visually tell surface shapes [25], [26].
As approximate surface representations, point cloud data
contain no texture and shading, and our shape perception
of poind clouds is mostly from their point-wise depths and
boundary contours. Consequently, point outliers produced
by existing methods [11], [22] would cause a spiky boundary
perception of the surfaces and thus draw our humans’
attention. In addition, these methods produce adversarial
point clouds that tend to be defended easily, by removing
the generated point outliers via simple statistical techniques
[27].
To address the issues analyzed above, we are motivated
by the fact that an adversarial point cloud, as a discrete
approximation of object surface, should satisfy (discrete
versions of) the general surface properties of smoothness and
fairness [28], which concern with the continuity and varia-
tion of (partial) derivatives of a parametric surface function,
in particular with the curvatures of local surface patches.
To achieve the objective of imperceptibility, we propose a
new solution of geometry-aware objectives, whose design is to
make the adversarial point cloud bear the aforementioned
general surface properties, while being close to the benign
point cloud under distance metrics of point set. Technically,
our proposed geometry-aware objectives enhance classical
distance terms of point set with a term that promotes
consistency of local curvatures between the adversarial and
benign point clouds. In this work, we consider the setting
of targeted attack [11], [19] and use a misclassification
loss that is able to achieve higher malicious levels when
compared with the traditional margin-based ones [11], [19].
Regularizing the more aggressive misclassification loss with
our proposed geometry-aware objectives gives our pro-
posed method of Geometry-Aware Adversarial Attack (GeoA3),
which is expected to produce more adversarial, arguably
less defendable, point clouds without introducing noticeable
modifications.
While our main focus of this paper is to learn to generate
adversarial point clouds, which would cause safety-critical
issues practically by guiding, for example, a LiDAR spoofer
[29] to fool the 3D sensor, it is more desirable to make
the underlying surfaces represented by the point clouds be
adversarial; otherwise, a benign surface re-sampling would
possibly defend the adversarial attack. As an attempt to-
wards generation of adversarial surfaces via generation of
adversarial point clouds, we present in this work a simple
but effective solving algorithm termed Iterative Tangent Jit-
tering (IterTanJit). When optimizing the objective of GeoA3,
IterTanJit introduces per iteration point-wise jittering of 3D
coordinates on the tangent planes associated with individ-
ual points contained in the intermediate update of adver-
sarial point cloud; by accumulating iteratively, IterTanJit
pursues optimization directions of adversarial updates that
account more for surface deformation.
We quantitatively evaluate adversarial point clouds gen-
erated by different methods in terms of attack success
rate, under the state-of-the-art defense [27], and geomet-
ric regularity; for the later evaluation we also propose a
new measure that is based on the same desired surface
property of low curvature. For qualitative evaluation, we
conduct subjective studies by collecting human preferences
from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Evaluation of surface-level
adversarial effects is conducted by first reconstructing object
meshes from the obtained adversarial point clouds, and then
evaluating the remained adversarial effects via re-sampling
point clouds from the reconstructed mesh surfaces. Physical
attack is conducted similarly by 3D printing the mesh recon-
structions and then re-scanning the printed objects to have
the point clouds to be evaluated. We present comprehensive
experiments which show the advantages of our proposed
methods over existing ones.
1.1 Related Works
We briefly review existing works that are closely related to
the present one. We organize the review into the following
three lines of research.
Adversarial Attack of 2D Images – The existence of
adversarial examples w.r.t. deep image classification net-
works is first suggested in [8]. Subsequent research pro-
poses various methods to generate adversarial examples
that are less likely to be perceived by our humans, yet
still able to attack the classification models. Representative
methods include Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [18],
C&W attack [19], and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
[20]. They typically search for pixel-level noise of small
magnitude on the domains of benign images, by optimizing
misclassification loss functions defined on the classification
models, such that superimposing the obtained noisy images
onto the respective benign ones produces the adversarial
results. More specifically, Goodfellow et al. [18] find that
moving a benign image towards the decision boundary of
a classification model via a single step of gradient update
is enough to generate the adversarial image. The C&W
attack proposed in [19] includes both the misclassification
loss and a loss constraining the magnitudes of adversarial
noise into the optimization objective, and empirical results
show that adversarial images generated by C&W attack are
both aggressive and difficult to be perceived. PGD [20] is a
multi-step optimization method that can be regarded as an
improved version of FGSM. These methods adopt lp-norms
to constrain the magnitudes of adversarial noise, which is
shown to be effective to satisfy the adversarial criterion of
imperceptibility. Apart from lp-norms, other measures such
as Perceptual Adversarial Similarity Score (PASS) [32] are
proposed to account more for the mechanism that humans
perceive 2D images, e.g., by measuring the regional illu-
mination, contrast, and structural similarity between the
adversarial images and benign ones. Unfortunately, due
to the sharp difference between our human perception of
2D images and that of 3D shapes (cf. the discussion in
Section 2.1), both lp-norms and PASS are less relevant for
generation of adversarial point clouds that are expected to
be imperceptible to our humans.
Adversarial Generation of 3D Point Clouds – Following
the studies on adversarial 2D images, there is a recent surge
of interest studying attacking point set classification models
[4], [5], [6] with adversarial point clouds [11], [21], [22],
[23], [33], [34]. Given a benign point cloud, these methods
generate adversarial ones either by perturbing the contained
individual points [11], [21], [22], [23], by removing some
of the points [22], [33], [34], or by attaching additional
points to the given point cloud [11], [22]. Intuitively, the
3Fig. 1: Adversarial examples of 2D images and 3D point clouds corresponding to the same object categories from the
PASCAL3D+ dataset [30]. Adversarial images are obtained by using C&W attack [19] against the Inception-V3 [31] model
of image classification. Adversarial point clouds are obtained respectively by using the method [11] and our proposed
GeoA3 against PointNet model [4].
strengths of adversarial attack depend on the numbers of
points that are free to be adjusted via optimization in the
generation process; consequently, point perturbation would
arguably be the most effective way while point detachment
would be the least effective one — indeed, point detachment
could be more of a way to study the point-wise saliency
for classification [33]. Technically, existing methods of ad-
versarial point clouds follow their 2D image counterparts;
they optimize point-wise coordinate offsets w.r.t. misclas-
sification loss functions defined on point set classification
models, where the offset searching is constrained either by
lp-norms or by classical point set distance functions. For
example, Xiang et al. [11] adopt the framework of C&W
attack [19], by respectively using l2-norm to constrain point-
wise perturbations and Chamfer or Hausdorff distances for
point attachment; Liu et al. [21] follow FGSM [18] by using
l2-norm or its variants as the constraints. In spite of the
attacking success achieved by existing methods, however,
they tend to generate adversarial point clouds that contain
clearly visible outliers. The generation of point outliers both
violates the adversarial criterion of imperceptibility and
makes the defense easier (e.g., via simple techniques of
outlier removal [27]). It is worth noting that a simple attempt
to achieve imperceptibility is made in [21] by iteratively
projecting the perturbed points back onto the mesh where
the benign point cloud is sampled from; unfortunately,
attacking success rates become very low by adopting this
attempt. A recent work from Tsai et al. [35] is motivated
to address the issue of point outliers. They propose into the
C&W framework a perturbation-constraining regularization
which combines a global Chamfer distance and a local term
that encourages the compactness of local neighborhoods in
the obtained adversarial point cloud (via constraining the
averaged distances among points in each neighborhood). In
addition, they propose a scheme to guide the gradient up-
date directions of adversarial offsets towards those of mesh-
level deformations. However, adversarial results generated
by [35] appear to have rugged surfaces, which are easy to be
perceived by our humans. In contrast, the geometry-aware
objectives proposed in the present work are intuitive and
clean, and are well grounded on the surface properties of
smoothness and fairness. Comparative experiments show
that our results are advantageous over those from [35] in
terms of both geometric regularity and attacking success
rate.
Deep Learning Point Cloud/Surface Reconstruction – Our
proposed geometry-aware generation of adversarial point
clouds is also related to the recent methods that learn deep
networks to generate 3D surface shapes in the forms of
either point cloud [36], [37] or mesh [38], [39], [40]. Among
these methods, Fan et al. [36] make the first attempt to
reconstruct a point cloud object surface from as few as a
single image. AtlasNet [38] and subsequent improvements
[39], [40] extend for learning to generate object surface
meshes by learning to deform the vertices of input, initial
meshes. While some learning terms defined in [39], [40]
are inspired by smooth surface properties as well, the same
source of inspiration would suggest different formulations
and learning objectives respectively useful in the contexts
of surface reconstruction or generation of adversarial point
clouds. More discussions on the technical differences are
given in Section 2.2.
1.2 Contributions
Our technical contributions are summarized as follows.
• Motivated by the different human perception of 3D
shapes from that of 2D images, we propose a new
method, termed Geometry-Aware Adversarial Attack
(GeoA3), for generation of adversarial point clouds
whose changes from the benign ones are expected
to be imperceptible to humans. GeoA3 is built on
a new design of geometry-aware objectives, which en-
ables the resulting adversarial point clouds to bear
(discrete versions of) the general surface properties
of smoothness and fairness.
• The proposed geometry-aware objectives afford a
more aggressive attack learning, for which we pro-
pose a new misclassification loss of targeted at-
tack that supports continuous pursuing of higher-
4level malicious signals. Regularizing the proposed
targeted attack loss with geometry-aware objectives
is expected to produce more adversarial, arguably
less defendable, point clouds without introducing
noticeable modifications.
• We also present a simple but effective solving algo-
rithm, termed Iterative Tangent Jittering (IterTanJit),
to have the practically desirable surface-level ad-
versarial effects in the generated adversarial point
clouds. IterTanJit iteratively accumulates optimiza-
tion directions of adversarial updates that account
more for surface deformation; the expectation is that
certain adversarial effects remain after re-sampling
point clouds from the surface meshes reconstructed
from adversarial point clouds.
• We quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate adver-
sarial point clouds and their remained adversarial
effects in the reconstructed mesh models and 3D
printed physical models. In addition to attack success
rate, we propose a new quantitative measure of ge-
ometric regularity that is based on the same desired
surface property of low curvature. Qualitative eval-
uation is also conducted by collecting human prefer-
ences from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Comparative
results in comprehensive experiments confirm the
advantages of our proposed methods over existing
ones.
Data, source codes, and pre-trained models are made
public at https://github.com/Yuxin-Wen/GeoA3.
2 ADVERSARIAL POINT CLOUDS OF OBJECT
SURFACE SHAPES
Our problem setting assumes the availability of a collection
of point clouds in the input space X , of which any point
cloud P ∈ X is an approximate shape representation of
its underlying object surface S of a certain category. Each
P contains an orderless set of n points {pi}ni=1, with the
corresponding label y ∈ Y of object category, where any
p = [x, y, z]> ∈ R3 denotes the coordinates in the Euclidean
space. In this work, we focus on machine learning models
of 3D point set classification [4], [5], [6], which learn a
classifier f : X → Y and expect f(P) = y for any input P
with the true label y. Given a learned f , our objective is to
obtain from P an adversarial point cloud P ′ by perturbing
its individual points {pi}ni=1; the obtained P ′ would be
misclassified by f . Similar to adversarial examples of 2D
images [8], the adversarial objective suggests that P ′ should
be as close to P as possible under certain distance metrics of
point set, such that the change from P to P ′ is imperceptible
to humans. In the subsequent description, with a slight
abuse of notation, we also use x ∈ X to represent a signal
of either 2D image or 3D point cloud, while using P ∈ X
particularly for point cloud data, which are self-clear in the
context.
2.1 The (Im)perceptibility of Adversarial Point Clouds
Studies on adversarial examples stem from robust analysis
of deep networks, particularly for convolutional networks
that are trained to classify 2D images. It is discovered
in [8] that for images correctly classified by a network,
superimposing certain noise of small magnitude to them
can fool the same network; these images are adversarial
since magnitudes of the noise are so small such that they
are less likely to be perceived by our humans. Most of
subsequent research [18], [19], [20], [41] formalizes this prob-
lem by proposing various algorithms to search pixel-wisely
independent noise under the constraints of small lp-norms
on the image domain, whose objectives can be generally
written as
min
x′
CMis(x
′) s.t. ‖x′ − x‖p ≤ , (1)
where CMis(x′) is a loss term promoting misclassification
of x′, and  is a small constant. With the constraints, appear-
ance patterns of the resulting images are still dominated by
the original ones.
While our intended study on adversarial point clouds
generally follows the same methodology, there exists a sharp
difference between our human perception of 2D images
and that of 3D shapes; psychophysical evidence shows that
humans perceive object surface shapes from combined vari-
ables of motion, texture, shading, boundary contour, etc [24].
Indeed, for adversarial images, the high-frequency informa-
tion provided by the added pixel-wisely independent noise
is overwhelmed by the appearance patterns contained in the
original, clean images; consequently, the noise addition is
imperceptible to our humans. As approximate surface repre-
sentations, point cloud data contain no texture and shading,
our shape perception of point clouds is mostly from their
point-wise depths and boundary contours. In fact, studies
have shown that contours themselves are particularly effec-
tive to visually tell surface shapes, and adding additional
surface information of shading, texture, and motion gives
only small improvements in shape judgment [25], [26].
Consequently, point perturbations would possibly produce
point outliers, which make a spiky boundary perception
of the surface and thus draw our humans’ attention. Our
human sensitivity to spiky surface is also supported from
study on the aesthetics of object shapes; in [42], experiments
find that when visiting an art gallery, visitors prefer shapes
with gentle curves over those with sharp points. To have a
more intuitive understanding of the difference between our
human perception of 2D images and 3D shapes, we show
in Figure 1 adversarial examples of 2D images and 3D point
clouds corresponding to the same object categories from the
PASCAL3D+ dataset [30]. We can hardly tell from Figure 1
the difference between adversarial images and benign ones,
but rather easily perceive the manipulation of adversarial
point clouds obtained by a representative existing method
[11]. In contrast, our proposed GeoA3 largely improves the
imperceptibility, while still being able to attack classification
successfully — in fact, we will show in Section 5 that
our method achieves even higher attacking success rates
than the method [11] does. We note that the above surface
perception issue is largely overlooked in existing works
of adversarial point clouds [11], [22]. In addition to this
issue, outlier points to an object surface are also easier to
be removed, causing the generated adversaries to be easily
defended [27].
5To address the aforementioned issues when preparing
adversarial point clouds, we are motivated from the fact
that as a discrete approximation of an object surface, a point
cloud P satisfies (discrete versions of) the general surface
properties of smoothness and fairness [28], which concern
with the continuity and variation of (partial) derivatives
of a parametric surface function; technically, the properties
concern with the curvatures of local surface patches. Since
the adversarial point cloud is expected to be impercep-
tible to humans, we argue that P ′ should satisfy these
surface properties as well, with similar degrees of smooth-
ness/fairness to local surface patches of P , while being
close to P when measured under certain distance metrics of
point set; otherwise, humans would notice either the global,
possibly topological changes of part configuration of the
object surface, or those of local surface details. Our analysis
leads to technical solutions of geometry-aware objectives to
generate adversarial point clouds, as presented shortly.
2.2 The Proposed Geometry-Aware Objectives
Analysis in Section 2.1 inspires us to modify a point cloud
P to have P ′ in a geometry-aware manner. This can be
technically achieved by objectives that constrain the mag-
nitudes of modification under distance metrics of point
set, while taking into account the local surface smoothness
of the resulting P ′, in particular prevention of generating
point outliers. In this section, we present these proposed
geometry-aware objectives; combining them with an addi-
tional misclassification loss gives our proposed method of
adversarial point cloud generation, which is to be presented
in Section 3.
Chamfer Distance – Given two point sets P and P ′ respec-
tively of n and n′ points, the Chamfer distance computes
CChamfer(P ′,P) = 1
n′
∑
p′∈P′
min
p∈P
‖p′ − p‖22
+
1
n
∑
p∈P
min
p′∈P′
‖p− p′‖22,
(2)
which is symmetric w.r.t. P and P ′. Although the Chamfer
distance (2) is not a strict distance metric, since the triangle
inequality does not hold, it is popularly used in the recent
literature of learning based 3D shape generation [36], [43],
[44]. It measures the distance between the two point sets by
averaging over the individual deviations of any p ∈ P from
P ′ and those of any p′ ∈ P ′ from P . We note that Chamfer
distance is less effective in prevention of outlier points when
generating P ′ from P , since a small portion of outliers in
P ′ increases the distance (2) negligibly. This shortcoming
of Chamfer distance motivates us to additionally use the
following Hausdorff distance.
Hausdorff Distance – For the point sets P and P ′, we
consider in this work a non-symmetric Hausdorff distance
that concerns with the resulting P ′ only, which computes
CHausdorff(P ′,P) = max
p′∈P′
min
p∈P
‖p′ − p‖22. (3)
As (3) indicates, the Hausdorff distance finds the largest one
among the smallest distances of individual p′ ∈ P ′ from P .
It is thus sensitive in case that outliers are generated in P ′.
Computation of distances (2) and (3) involves individual
points contained in P and P ′, but not the local surface
geometries centered on them; consequently, it is possible
that less smooth surface change, including generation of
spiky points, would visibly appear in the resulting P ′, even
though P ′ could be close to P when measured by (2) and/or
(3), causing failure to achieve the imperceptible objective
of adversarial modification. We introduce the following
objective to reduce the less smooth surface modification.
Consistency of Local Curvatures – Our way to achieve
imperceptible modification of adversarial point cloud can
be generally described as ensuring the local consistency of
curvatures between the surface of P and that of P ′, where
local consistency means that for a spatially closest pair of
surface points respectively from P and P ′, their magnitudes
of curvature are similar. Since computations in this work
are conducted on the discrete point clouds, we rely on the
following discrete notions of point-wise curvature.
For any point p′ ∈ P ′, we find its closest point p ∈ P by
p = argminp∈P ‖p′ − p‖2. There exist local point neighbor-
hoods N ′p′ ⊂ P ′ and Np ⊂ P respectively associated with
p′ and p, which are obtained in this work by searching k
nearest neighbors, suggesting |N ′p′ | = |Np| = k. To capture
the local geometry of Np, we rely on the following discrete
notion
κ(p;P) = 1
k
∑
q∈Np
|〈(q − p)/‖q − p‖2,np〉| , (4)
where np denotes the unit normal vector of the surface at
p. We follow [45] and compute np from Np as follows: we
first generate a 3×3 positive semidefinite covariance matrix
C =
∑
q∈Np
(q − p)⊗ (q − p), (5)
where⊗ denotes the outer product operation; we then apply
eigen-decomposition to C, obtaining np as the eigenvector
corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue of C; the first two
eigenvectors define the surface tangent plane T (Np) at p.
The term (4) intuitively measures the averaged angles
between the normal vector and the vector defined by point-
ing p towards each q of its neighboring points. Indeed,
since the normal vector np is orthogonal to the tangent
plane T (Np) of the surface at p, each inner product in
(4) characterizes how the normals vary directionally in the
local neighborhood Np, thus approximately measuring the
local, directional curvature, and an average of |Np| inner
products in (4) approximately measures the local, mean
curvature. We compute κ′(p′;P ′) in the same way as (4),
with a subtle difference that instead of computing n′p′ from
N ′p′ , we directly use np, i.e., the unit normal vector of the
point in P that is closest to p′, as a surrogate of n′p′ , since
normal vectors of P can be pre-computed and efficiently
retrieved during the modification process.
Given κ′(p′;P ′,P) and κ(p;P), we use the following
objective to encourage the consistency of local geometries
between any p′ ∈ P ′ and its closest point p ∈ P
CCurvature(P ′,P) = 1
n′
∑
p′∈P′
‖κ′(p′;P ′,P)− κ(p;P)‖22
s.t. p = argmin
p∈P
‖p′ − p‖2,
(6)
6where we write κ′(p′;P ′,P) since the normal vector in-
volved in its computation is from the corresponding one
of P . Note that terms similar to (4) are also used in [39],
[40] for single-view surface reconstruction. Our use of the
term (4) in (6) is to encourage the consistency of local
surface geometries between P ′ and P , rather than to directly
minimize (4) as in [39], [40].
The Combined Geometry-Aware Objective – We use the
following combined objective to learn to perturb individual
points of P to obtain P ′
CGeometry(P ′,P) = CChamfer(P ′,P)+
λ1 · CHausdorff(P ′,P) + λ2 · CCurvature(P ′,P),
(7)
where λ1 and λ2 are penalty parameters whose default
values are set as λ1 = 0.1 and λ2 = 1, which work well in all
our experiments; a sensitivity analysis on how their settings
affect empirical performance is also presented in Section
5. The combined objective CGeometry(P ′,P) (7), shortened
as CGeo(P ′,P), will be used a regularizer to penalize a
misclassification loss, as specified in (10).
2.3 Evaluation of Geometric Regularity for Point Cloud
Representation of Object Surface
For a given point cloud P representing an object surface, it
is in general difficult to measure its geometric regularity in
a quantitative manner. In this work, we are inspired by the
desired surface property of fairness [28], and introduce the
following discrete and approximate measure to quantify the
regularity of P
R(P) = max
p∈P
1
k
∑
q∈Np
D(q, T (Np)), (8)
where D(·) computes the l2-norm distance between any
neighboring point q ∈ Np and its projection onto the
tangent plane T (Np) computed from the neighborhoodNp.
Note that a surface is generally considered as fair if its
curvatures are globally minimized. The proposed measure
(8) is easily computable, and functions as an approximate
surrogate of the globally maximum curvature defined on the
discrete point cloud, since a surface with high values of local
curvature gives a high value of R(P). Thus, the lower value
of R(P) is, the more regular P is. The proposed R(P) is also
relevant to the measure of perceptual aesthetics [46], [47],
since both of them are motivating from the same desired
surface property of fairness. In Section 5, we show that
(8) is quite relevant in capturing regularities of adversarial
point clouds, by collecting human preference over those
generated by different methods from Amazon Mechanical
Turk.
3 GENERATION OF ADVERSARIAL POINT CLOUDS
Assume a model f : X → Y that classifies benign signals.
Generation of adversarial signals aims to obtain from a
benign x a crafted malicious x′ such that x′ would be
misclassified by the model f(·), where the modification
from x to x′ is expected to be imperceptible to our humans.
In the literature of adversarial 2D image generation, there
exist generally two settings respectively termed as untar-
geted attack [18], [48], [49] and targeted attack [8], [32], [50].
Assume the true label of x be y ∈ Y , and x is correctly
classified by f(·), i.e., f(x) = y. Untargeted attack generates
an adversarial signal x′ such that f(x′) 6= y. Targeted attack
generates x′ such that f(x′) = yˆ, with yˆ ∈ Y but yˆ 6= y. It is
obvious that targeted attack is a more involved task setting
than the untargeted one, by crafting specified malicious
signals. In this work, we focus on the setting of targeted
attack for point cloud data, which generates P ′ such that P ′
is classified as a specified class yˆ 6= y.
Technically, we adapt the state-of-the-art framework of
C&W attack [19] to achieve the goal. Let the classification
model f(·) be realized by a function g : X → R|Y|, and
we have f(x) = argmaxi∈Y gi(x), where gi(·) takes the
ith element of g(·). When implementing f(·) as a deep
classification network, g(·) outputs the network logits, i.e.,
output of the network before the final softmax. C&W attack
commonly uses a margin based loss for the misclassification
term in the general adversarial objective (1), which gives
CMis(x
′) = max{maxi 6=yˆ gi(x′) − gyˆ(x′), 0}. This margin
based CMis(x′) would stop pursuing more malicious sig-
nals once maxi 6=yˆ gi(x′) − gyˆ(x′) ≤ 0. In this work, we use
the following misclassification loss to increase the malicious
levels possibly achieved by targeted attack of point clouds
CMis(P ′) = − log
exp(gyˆ(P ′))/ |Y|∑
i=1
exp(gi(P ′))
 , (9)
where yˆ is the specified class of targeted attack. Regularizing
CMis(P ′) with our proposed geometry-aware regularizer
(7) gives our proposed method of Geometry-Aware Adver-
sarial Attack (GeoA3) for learning adversarial point cloud
P ′ from P
min
P′
CAdv(P ′,P) = CMis(P ′) + β · CGeo(P ′,P), (10)
where β is a penalty parameter controlling the overall
level of geometry-aware regularization, whose setting fol-
lows [19] and is automatically adjusted via binary search.
Minimization of (10) can be simply achieved by Stochastic
Gradient Descent (SGD) (or its variants [51]), which gives
the following rule to update P ′t+1 from P ′t
P ′t+1 ← P ′t − η · ∇CAdv(P ′t,P), (11)
where η is the learning rate. We note that without our
proposed (7), the more aggressive misclassification loss
(9) would produce P ′ whose modification from P could
be clearly perceived. It is our combined use of (9) and
geometry-aware regularizer (7) that enables pursuing more
adversarial, arguably less defendable, point clouds with-
out introducing noticeable modifications. In practice, we
generate an adversarial P ′ by minimizing (10) to perturb
individual points {pi}ni=1 contained in P , which technically
means an iterative optimization of adversarial point-wise
coordinate offsets. We conduct thorough empirical studies
in Section 5 to verify our proposed GeoA3 objective.
The input P is obtained by sampling a discrete set of
points from a certain object surface. Consequently, adversar-
ial effects achieved by point perturbation may be attributed
to coupled factors of surface shape deformation and point cloud
7re-sampling, since the resulting P ′ may represent a discrete
sampling from a deformed surface shape, a re-sampling
from the same original shape, or a mixture of them. We
study this issue shortly in an attempt towards generation
of adversarial surface shapes.
4 TOWARDS GENERATION OF ADVERSARIAL SUR-
FACE SHAPES
While our main focus of this paper is to learn to generate
from a given P an adversarial P ′ w.r.t. a model f(·), which
would practically cause safety-critical issues by using P ′ to
guide a LiDAR spoofer [29] to fool the 3D sensor, it is more
desirable to make the underlying surface S ′ represented by
P ′ adversarial to the surface S represented by P . Indeed,
when P ′ only represents an adversarial sampling of the
original S , it would be easily defended by a benign re-
sampling. Technically, this desirable objective is to obtain
a P ′ such that when re-sampling a Q′ from a surface
reconstructed by P ′ (e.g., via meshing from P ′),Q′ still has a
certain degree of adversarial effect to attack the model f(·).
To this end, we propose in this work a simple algorithm
termed Iterative Tangent Jittering (IterTanJit). When optimiz-
ing our proposed objective (10) via SGD, IterTanJit intro-
duces per iteration point-wise jittering of 3D coordinates
on the tangent planes associated with individual points
contained in the intermediate update of the adversarial P ′.
Specifically, for any p′t ∈ P ′t of the intermediate update at
iteration t, we compute its associated tangent plane T (Np′t)
from the neighborhood Np′t . Note that T (Np′t) is spanned
by the two leading eigenvectors v1(Np′t) and v2(Np′t) of a
covariance matrix constructed by (5), as described in Section
2.2. To have a jittering of p′t on its tangent plane, we sample
a scaling pair (s1, s2) from a Gaussian distribution with a
standard deviation of σ, resulting in
j′t = s1 · v1(Np′t) + s2 · v2(Np′t)
s.t. s1, s2 ∼ Normal(0, σ). (12)
Denote {j′t}, corresponding to all the points of P ′t, collec-
tively as J ′t , IterTanJit updates (10) by
P ′t+1 ← P ′t − η · ∇CAdv(P ′t + J ′t ,P). (13)
Rationale of the proposed (13) is that at each iteration t,
IterTanJit treats P ′t + J ′t as a randomized (approximate) re-
sampling from the underlying surface S ′t represented by
P ′t, such that the direction of adversarial update accounts
more for surface deformation; the accumulated expectation
by conducting (13) iteratively is to obtain a final P ′ = P ′T
whose adversarial effect comes more from a deformation of
the input shape S . To improve efficiency of the proposed
IterTanJit, we only update the neighborhood Np′t per p′t
every certain number of iterations.
Practical Implementation and Physical Attack - Practically,
we employ screened Poisson surface reconstruction [52] to
reconstruct a surface mesh S ′ from a given P ′, and use a
strategy of farthest point sampling [5] to re-sample a Q′
from the reconstructed S ′. For physical attack, we do 3D
printing using S ′ and then scan the printed object to obtain
Q′. The respectively obtained Q′ is used for evaluation of
attack performance.
5 EXPERIMENTS
Dataset – We use object instances from ModelNet40 [53]
to evaluate our proposed methods. The dataset consists of
12, 311 CAD models belonging to 40 semantic categories.
To have a point cloud, we follow [5] and sample points
uniformly from each CAD model and then normalize them
into a unit ball. We use the official data splits of ModelNet40
for point set classification [4], [5], which give 9, 843 instances
to train classifiers that are to be attacked. For testing, we
follow [11] and randomly select 25 instances for each of 10
object categories in the ModelNet40 testing set, which can
be well classified by the classifiers of interest. The 10 object
categories include airplane, bed, bookshelf, bottle, chair, monitor,
sofa, table, toilet, and vase.
Evaluation Metrics – To quantitatively compare the adver-
sarial results generated by different methods, we use both
the measure of attack success rate and that of geometric
regularity. The former measures, among the input, benign
point clouds, the ratio of their adversarial results that suc-
cessfully fool a classifier; note that all the benign point
clouds are classified correctly by the classifier. We use the
proposed R(P ′) (8) to measure the geometric regularity of
any adversarial P ′; a geometrically regular P ′ gives a lower
value of R(P ′). A better-performing method is expected
to generate adversarial results that achieve higher attack
success rates and lower values of R(P ′), simultaneously. We
report attack success rates under a state-of-the-art defense
method of Statistical Outlier Removal (SOR) [27], which
works by statistically dropping certain points from any
adversarial P ′; more specifically, if the distance between a
point and its neighbors are much larger than such distance
averaged over the whole P ′, this point will be considered as
an outlier and will be dropped by SOR. Geometric regularity
is reported by averaging R(P ′) over adversarial results
of all instances. We also conduct subjective studies for a
qualitative evaluation by collecting human preferences from
Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Models and Implementation Details – We use PointNet
[4], PointNet++ [5], and DGCNN [6] as our classifiers of
interest, against which comparative methods fire attacks.
Without mentioning otherwise, all the methods follow a
white-box, targeted attack protocol via point perturbation.
We use Adam [51] to optimize the objective (10) of our
proposed GeoA3, where the learning rate and momentum
are respectively set as 0.01 and 0.9. We set k = 16 to define
local point neighborhoods. We use the default values of
λ1 = 0.1 and λ2 = 1.0 for penalty parameters in (7). The
penalty β in (10) is initialized as 2, 500 and automatically
adjusted via binary search, which follows [19].
5.1 Ablation Studies and Sensitivity Analysis
To test the efficacy of our proposed GeoA3 (10), we first
conduct ablation studies by removing individual terms in
the geometry-aware regularizer (7) and compare the results
quantitatively and qualitatively. Table 1 shows that across
a range of dropping ratios via the state-of-the-art defense
SOR [27], attack success rates drop by removing any one of
the three terms in (7), with the term of Hausdorff distance
playing the most important role and that of consistency of
8TABLE 1: Ablation studies on our proposedGeoA3 (10). Each input, benign point cloud contains 1, 024 points. Performance
is measured in terms of both the attack success rate (%) and geometric regularityR(P ′) (8). Attack success rates are reported
by dropping a range of ratios of points from their adversarial results using the state-of-the-art SOR defense method [27].
All experiments are conduced using PointNet [4] as the model of classifier.
Method
Attack success rate (%)
defense by dropping different ratios of points via SOR [27] Geometric regularity
R(P ′)
0% 1% 2% 5% 10% 15% 20%
GeoA3 with all three geometry-aware terms 100 83.47 70.56 52.61 31.58 18.62 11.71 0.0968
w/o Chamfer Distance 100 82.17 68.14 50.08 30.24 15.14 10.01 0.1020
w/o Hausdorff Distance 100 24.51 18.89 11.68 6.60 3.97 3.12 0.1588
w/o Consistency of Local Curvatures 100 53.85 35.90 14.88 5.57 2.81 2.00 0.1055
Fig. 2: Example results of ablation study by removing individual terms from our proposed geometry-aware regularizer (7),
where CD stands for the term of Chamfer distance, HD for that of Hausdorff distance, and Curvature for that of consistency
of local curvatures. Each input, benign point cloud contains 1, 024 points, to which adversarial attacks are applied. Results
are from a bottle instance that is attacked against PointNet [4], targeting at the categories of bed, bookshelf, monitor, sofa, and
toilet. All the shown examples conduct the attacks successfully. Lens of different colors are used to highlight the differences
among the comparative methods. Comparative results from instances of other categories are of similar quality.
TABLE 2: Adversarial results when respectively sampling different numbers of points from each CAD model as the
working point clouds. Performance is measured in terms of both the attack success rate (%) and geometric regularity
R(P ′) (8). Attack success rates are reported by dropping a range of ratios of points from their adversarial results using the
state-of-the-art SOR defense method [27]. All experiments are conduced using PointNet [4] as the model of classifier.
Number of points
Attack success rate (%)
defense by dropping different ratios of points via SOR [27] Geometric regularity
R(P ′)
0% 1% 2% 5% 10% 15% 20%
1, 024 100 83.47 70.56 52.61 31.58 18.62 11.71 0.0968
2, 048 100 81.02 70.44 48.36 28.04 16.58 10.62 0.0988
4, 096 100 80.80 71.11 47.73 22.31 18.04 9.87 0.0997
9Fig. 3: Sensitivity analysis of our method w.r.t. the values of λ1 and λ2 in the geometry-aware regularizer (7). We plot both
the attack success rate (%), under the SOR defense [27] of 5% point dropping, and geometric regularity (8) by varying
the values of either λ1 (left) or λ2 (right) around their respective default values of λ1 = 0.1 and λ2 = 1. Experiments
are conducted on point clouds of 1, 024 points using PointNet [4] as the model of classifier. For a better comparison, an
example result from a bottle instance is also accompanied for each setting of λ1 and λ2 values.
TABLE 3: Results of our method when attacking different models of point set classifiers including PointNet [4], PointNet++
[5], and DGCNN [6]. Each input, benign point cloud contains 1, 024 points. Performance is measured in terms of both the
attack success rate (%), under different ratios of point dropping via the state-of-the-art SOR defense [27], and geometric
regularity R(P ′) (8).
Model
Attack success rate (%)
defense by dropping different ratios of points via SOR [27] Geometric regularity
R(P ′)
0% 1% 2% 5% 10% 15% 20%
PointNet [4] 100 83.47 70.56 52.61 31.58 18.62 11.71 0.0968
PointNet++ [5] 100 72.09 56.46 31.73 14.57 7.48 3.78 0.1037
DGCNN [6] 100 64.28 50.12 26.47 10.08 2.99 2.67 0.1368
local curvatures following. The observations are consistent
for the measure of geometric regularity. To qualitatively
understand how the three terms play roles for generating
visually less perceptible adversarial point clouds, we show
in Figure 2 example results, which tells that removing any
of three terms will produce adversarial results containing
either less regular surfaces or clearly visible outliers. Results
from instances of other categories are of similar quality.
These comparisons confirm the combined advantage of
our proposed geometry-aware regularizer (7) for generating
adversarial point clouds that are both less defendable and
less perceptible, simultaneously.
While most of the experiments are conducted on point
clouds of 1, 024 points, it is interesting to investigate
whether the adversarial effects vary w.r.t. different numbers
of points per instance. We conduct such experiments by
respectively sampling 1, 024, 2, 048, and 4, 096 points from
each CAD model as our working point clouds. We corre-
spondingly set their sizes of local neighborhoods as k = 16,
32, and 64. Table 2 shows that under both the measures
of attack success rate and geometric regularity, our results
are relatively stable w.r.t. different numbers of points. We
choose point clouds of 1, 024 points as the default setting.
To investigate how the penalty parameters λ1 and λ2
in the geometry-aware regularizer (7) affect adversarial
efficacy, we conduct experiments by varying each of them
around their default values, while keeping the other one
fixed. Plottings in Figure 3 show that attack success rates
are relatively stable w.r.t. different values of λ1 and λ2, and
our default values of λ1 = 0.1 and λ2 = 1 give the optimal
results in terms of geometric regularity.
We finally investigate the efficacy of our proposed
GeoA3 to attack different models of point set classifiers.
We use the representative PointNet++ [5] and DGCNN [6]
whose classification performance on the benchmark Mod-
elNet40 [53] is better than that of PointNet [4]. Table 3
shows that the attacking performance declines with the im-
proved design of point set classifiers, and the corresponding
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TABLE 4: Comparative results of different methods for adversarial point clouds. Each input, benign point cloud contains
1, 024 points. Performance is measured in terms of both the attack success rate (%) and geometric regularity R(P ′) (8).
For different methods, attack success rates are reported by dropping a range of ratios of points from their adversarial
results using the state-of-the-art SOR defense method [27]. All experiments are conduced using PointNet [4] as the model
of classifier.
Method
Attack success rate (%)
defense by dropping different ratios of points via SOR [27] Geometric regularity
R(P ′)
0% 1% 2% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Xiang’s method [11] 100 1.42 1.24 0.98 0.80 0.67 0.49 0.1772
Liu’s method [21] 100 0.63 0.40 0.36 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.1658
Tsai’s method [35] 100 23.84 17.74 14.50 11.12 9.01 8.12 0.1602
Degenerate GeoA3 100 3.21 1.60 1.02 0.62 0.36 0.31 0.1956
GeoA3 100 83.47 70.56 52.61 31.58 18.62 11.71 0.0968
Fig. 4: Qualitative comparisons among adversarial results generated by different methods. Each point cloud contains 1, 024
points. Results are from a bottle instance that is attacked against PointNet [4], targeting at the categories of bed, bookshelf,
monitor, sofa, and toilet. All the shown example results can successfully make the targeted attacks. The respective competing
methods are compared with our GeoA3 by highlighting the local differences using lens of varying colors. Results of
different methods from other instances and targeting categories are of similar comparative quality.
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Fig. 5: An interface we use to conduct subjective user studies
by uploading onto Amazon Mechanical Turk a triple of
point cloud snapshots including the benign one, the ad-
versarial one generated by Xiang’s method [11], and the
adversarial one generated by our GeoA3. All the uploaded
results attack PointNet [4] successively.
geometric regularities drop as well. Such a phenomenon
suggests that more effective attacking methods need to be
designed specially to attack advanced models of point set
classifiers, which is different from adversarial attacking of
2D images [9] where advanced image classifiers tend to be
more vulnerable to adversarial examples. In the subsequent
experiments, we use PointNet as the model of classifier to
compare with existing methods for generation of adversarial
point clouds.
5.2 Comparative Results of Adversarial Point Clouds
In this section, we compare our proposed GeoA3 with exist-
ing methods [11], [21], [35] that generate adversarial point
clouds under the setting of white-box, targeted attack. In
Xiang’s method [11], adversarial point perturbation follows
the framework of C&W attack [19], by using a margin-based
misclassification loss regularized by point-wise l2-norms
constraining the magnitudes of point perturbation. Liu’s
method [21] adopts a variant of the basic iterative method
in [41], under a constraint of l2-norm distance between the
entire, benign point cloud and the adversarial one. Tsai’s
method [35] also follows the framework of C&W attack,
whose constraint combines a global Chamfer distance and a
local term that encourages the compactness of local neigh-
borhoods in the generated adversarial point cloud. Results
of these methods are obtained either by using their released
codes, when available, or by reproducing their methods; in
both cases, we tune their respective hyper-parameters as
the optimal ones. In addition to existing methods, we also
compare with a degenerate version of our method, dubbed
Degenerate GeoA3, which replaces our proposed geometry-
aware (7) with constraints used in existing methods, i.e.,
point-wise l2-norm, while keeping the use of our more ag-
gressive misclassification loss (9). Comparing with Degen-
erate GeoA3 thus further highlights the importance of our
proposed (7) for generation of adversarial point clouds. All
the comparative experiments are conducted using PointNet
[4] as the model of classifier.
In Table 4, we compare different methods under the
measures of attack success rate, again under the state-of-
the-art SOR defense, and geometric regularity R(P ′) (8).
Under both of the two measures, our proposed GeoA3
performs much better, across a range of dropping ratios
via SOR, than both the existing methods and Degenerate
GeoA3 do. The comparisons confirm the combined efficacy
of using our more aggressive misclassification loss (9) and
geometry-aware regularizer (7) to simultaneously achieve
the strongest adversarial attacking and least visual per-
ception of the perturbations. The later advantage of our
method is illustrated in Figure 4 where we show adversarial
results of a bottle instance that is attacked, targeting at 5
different categories, by different methods (the same instance
and targeting categories as in Figure 2). Clearly, GeoA3
gives adversarial results whose visual differences from the
benign ones can arguably be least perceived by humans; re-
sults from competing methods contain either point outliers
and/or local geometric irregularities.
Subjective Evaluation - A subjective user study is im-
plemented on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) in order
to evaluate visually imperceptible quality of adversarial
results. Specifically, for each object instance, we upload onto
AMT a triple of point cloud snapshots including the benign
one, the adversarial one generated by Xiang’s method [11],
and the adversarial one generated by our GeoA3; all the
uploaded adversarial results attack the PointNet classifier
successively. Online participants are asked to compare to
discriminate which one of the two adversarial point clouds
are visually more similar to the benign one. To implement
the subjective comparison properly, we do the following:
the order of showing the two results is randomized, each
participant is limited to contribute at most 30 trials, and each
adversarial result can be shown up to 50 different partici-
pants. In total, we collect 1, 500 trials from 128 participants;
82.06% of the trials consider adversarial results from our
GeoA3 visually closer to the benign ones, when compared
against those from Xiang’s method [11]. An AMT interface
for our conducted subjective study is shown in Figure 5.
We finally show in Figure 6 more example results of
adversarial point clouds from our method in an adversarial
attacking matrix, where an example instance of each cat-
egory is attacked against PointNet [4] targeting at all the
other 9 categories.
5.3 Evaluation of Adversarial Surface Shapes and
Physical Attacks
As discussed in Section 4, it could be practically less de-
fendable when adversarial effect of a generated point cloud
P ′ comes more from a deformation of surface shape, which
essentially defines a much challenging task of surface-level
adversarial attack. In Section 4, we also propose a sim-
ple optimizing algorithm of IterTanJit towards generation
of adversarial surface shapes. To evaluate its efficacy and
compare with the existing Tsai’s method [35], we follow the
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Fig. 6: Adversarial examples from our proposed GeoA3. Results are organized in a matrix form where each off-diagonal
entry presents the adversarial point cloud obtained by attacking an example instance from a certain category against
PointNet [4], targeting at one of the remaining 9 categories, and the diagonal entry presents the input, benign point cloud.
TABLE 5: Evaluation of surface-level adversarial effects for results generated by different methods. For each adversarial
result P ′, we use screened Poisson surface reconstruction [52] to get its mesh S ′, from which farthest point sampling [5] is
used to re-sample a Q′. Performance is measured in terms of both the attack success rate (%) and geometric regularity (8)
on P ′ and Q′. All experiments are conduced using PointNet [4] as the model of classifier.
Method Attack success rate (%) on P
′ /
Geometric regularity R(P ′)
Attack success rate (%) on Q′ after meshing and re-sampling /
Geometric regularity R(Q′)
avg. airplane bed bookshelf bottle chair monitor sofa table toilet vase
Tsai’s method [35] 100/0.1605 32.6/0.0865 0.0 16.0 16.0 86.0 8.0 16.0 4.0 92.0 4.0 84.0
GeoA3 100/0.0852 14.0/0.0791 4.0 16.0 8.0 16.0 4.0 12.0 4.0 4.0 12.0 60.0
GeoA3-IterTanJit 100/0.1024 34.4/0.0829 0.0 20.0 12.0 72.0 28.0 12.0 12.0 92.0 12.0 84.0
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Fig. 7: Example results of adversarial point clouds generated by different methods, and their corresponding meshing and
re-sampling results. Accompanying each point cloud is the category predicted by the PointNet [4] model of classifier; a red
category indicates a successful attack.
Fig. 8: Example meshes, their printed objects, and scanned point clouds. These results are obtained by first 3D-printing the
mesh S ′ constructed from an adversarial P ′ generated by our proposed GeoA3-IterTanJit, and then scanning the printed
object to have the point cloud Q′. UnionTech Lite600HD 3D printer (materials of 9400 resin) is used for this purpose.
Accompanying each example is the category predicted by the PointNet [4] model of classifier; a blue category indicates the
original label and a red category indicates a successful attack.
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relatively easier setting of untargeted attack used in [35].
Our objective of untargeted attack is a variant of (10), by
modifying its misclassification loss term (9) as
CMis(P ′) = log
exp(gy(P ′))/ |Y|∑
i=1
exp(gi(P ′))
 ,
where y is the ground-truth label of input point cloud. We
randomly sample 25 instances from each of the considered
10 object categories as the working CAD models. For each
CAD model, we uniformly sample 4, 096 points to have the
input, benign P , whose adversarial result P ′ is obtained by
point-wise perturbation through optimization of the above
modified version of (10) using IterTanJit. We set σ = 0.02
in (12) to sample point-wise jittering. After obtaining an ad-
versarial P ′, we use screened Poisson surface reconstruction
[52] to get its mesh S ′, from which we either use farthest
point sampling [5] to re-sample a point cloud Q′, or do 3D
printing using S ′ and then scan the printed object to obtain
Q′. The respectively obtained Q′ is used for evaluation of
attacking performance.
Table 5 compares our methods with the only existing
method [35] that aims for better surface-level adversarial
effects when generating adversarial point clouds. For any
P ′ generated by Tsai’s method [35], we do the same pro-
cedure of meshing and re-sampling to have its re-sampled
Q′. While directly optimizing the untargeted attack vari-
ant of (10) using SGD (i.e., GeoA3 in Table 5) performs
poorly in terms of measuring attack success rate on Q′,
optimization via our proposed algorithm of IterTanJit (i.e.,
GeoA3-IterTanJit in Table 5) greatly improves the attacking
performance and outperforms Tsai’s method as well. Note
that our better attacking performance is achieved at a less
violation of the imperceptibility criterion measured by both
of the geometric regularities R(P ′) and R(Q′). Figure 7
gives example results of the adversarial P ′, meshing S ′, and
re-sampled Q′ respectively from different methods, where
one may perceive less perturbations in the results generated
by our methods. Results in Table 5 suggest that achieving
surface-level attacks via generation of adversarial point
clouds is indeed a challenging task, and our contributed
algorithm takes only a small step towards the desired goal.
Among the 250 testing instances used in this section, we
do 3D printing for 15 of them which are among the success-
ful attacking cases reported in Table 5. We do 3D printing
using their respective S ′, and then scan each printed object
to have the corresponding Q′, which is used for evaluation
of adversarial attack. 10 out of the 15 instances can still
attack the PointNet classifier successfully after 3D printing
and scanning, showing that our proposed GeoA3-IterTanJit
has a certain degree of robustness to preserve adversarial
effects. Example meshes, their printed objects, and scanned
point clouds are shown in Figure 8.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study learning to generate adversarial
point clouds in order to attack deep models of point set
classifiers. We focus on the key characterization of impercep-
tibility to humans that adversarial point clouds should have,
which is largely overlooked in existing methods. We analyze
the different mechanisms that humans perceive 2D images
and 3D shapes, and propose a new method of GeoA3 whose
objective combines a misclassification loss of targeted attack
and a new design of geometry-aware regularizer. Our pro-
posed regularizer favors solutions with the desired surface
properties of smoothness and fairness, while the targeted
attack loss supports continuous pursuing of more malicious
signals. The combined effect enables GeoA3 to generate
adversarial results that are arguably less defendable and of
the key adversarial characterization of being imperceptible
to humans. Comparative results confirm the advantages of
our GeoA3 in terms of both quantitative and qualitative
measures. To generate practically more desirable adversarial
surfaces, we make an attempt in this paper and propose
a simple algorithm of IterTanJit to optimize GeoA3. Solv-
ing GeoA3 via IterTanJit can better preserve surface-level
adversarial effects when re-sampling point clouds from the
surface meshes reconstructed from the obtained adversarial
point clouds. Experiments of both synthetic and physical
attacks show the efficacy of our contributed algorithm.
However, surface-level adversarial attack is still at a much
lower successful rate. In future research, we are interested
in improving the attacking performance either by advanced
methods of adversarial point cloud generation or by directly
learning to generate adversarial meshes.
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